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Structured Abstract 
Purpose: The paper aims to provide an assessment of how the widespread adoption of new 
digital technologies (i.e. the internet of things, big data and analytics, robotic systems, and 
additive manufacturing) might affect the location and organisation of activities within global 
value chains (GVCs). 
Approach: The approach in this paper is to review various sources about the potential adoption 
and impact of the new digital technologies (commonly known collectively as Industry 4.0), to 
contrast these technologies with existing technologies, and to consider how the new 
technologies might lead to new configurations involving suppliers, firms and customers. 
Findings: We report that the new digital technologies have considerable potential to disrupt 
how and where activities are located and organized within GVCs), and who captures the value-
added within those chains. We also report that Industry 4.0 is still in its infancy, but that its 
effects are already having an impact upon the nature of competition and corporate strategies in 
many industries. 
Implications: In particular, we draw attention to the potential cyber-risks and implications for 
the privacy of individuals, and hence the need for regulation. 
Originality/value: This is the first published paper to consider the likely separate and joint 
impacts of the new digital technologies on the practice and theory of international business. 
Keywords: industry 4.0; digital technologies; internet of things; big data; robotics; additive 
manufacturing; 3-D printing; global value chains; international business 
Paper type: Viewpoint 
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Industry 4.0, Global Value Chains and International Business 
 
 
 
What is Industry 4.0? 
Industry 4.01 is a term reputedly first used to describe a high-technology strategy 
proposed by the German government, and but now commonly used to refer to the development 
of “cyber-physical systems (CPS) and dynamic data processes that use massive amounts of 
data to drive smart machines” (Sirkin et al, 2015b). More specifically, Industry 4.0 refers to 
the emergence and diffusion of a range of new digital industrial technologies (Rüβmann et al, 
2015), notably embedded sensors so that smart products and devices can communicate and 
interact with each other (the Internet of Things); the collection and real-time evaluation of data 
to optimize the costs and quality of production (Big Data and Analytics); robots with greater 
autonomy and flexibility; and advanced manufacturing techniques, such as additive 
manufacturing (3-D printing)2. Many of these digital technologies have been available for some 
time, but recent cost reductions and improvements in reliability mean that their deployment for 
industrial applications is now more commercially viable (Baum and Wee, 2015) though it 
likely that this deployment may well take 15-20 years to be fully realised. Potentially industry 
4.0 may bring about a change from isolated manufacturing activities to automated, optimized 
and fully-integrated product and data flows within (global) value chains.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. We first outline the key features of the four new digital 
technologies, and discuss their likely impacts of their deployment on the location and 
organisation of activities within global value chains (GVCs). We then consider the implications 
of the technologies for IB theory and, in particular, for the nature of ownership, location, and 
internalisation advantages experienced my multinational enterprises (MNEs). We finish by 
highlighting various policy issues and putting forward some suggestions for future research.  
 
The New Digital Technologies and their Impacts on the Configuration of GVCs  
 In this section, we briefly outline the essential features of the four digital technologies, 
and discuss how their (eventual) adoption might disrupt existing configurations of location and 
control within global value chains. 
 
The Internet of Things (IoT) 
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 An increasing number of physical products are being equipped with sensors that are 
able to capture and process data, and to then communicate that data to people and other 
products. Much of the popular attention has been devoted to consumer applications, such as 
connected household appliances3. But the potential for business-to-business applications are 
potentially more far-reaching, with sensors able to provide real-time data inter alia to detect 
equipment wear-and-tear and thus permit preventative maintenance, to monitor inventory 
levels and allow better capacity planning, and to assess the usage and functionality of products 
(Bughin et al, 2015a). This will involve a greater integration of data between firms, suppliers 
and customers, and a reduction in the need for intermediaries (Porter and Heppelmann, 2014). 
Furthermore, the IoT will bring fundamental changes in the management of geographically-
dispersed value chains. Presently, most firms monitor flows of physical products, and also 
maintain separate flows of information. But, with IoT, products will be assigned unique 
identifiers, and will be inextricably linked to information about their provenance, use, and 
destination. There will no longer be a need to coordinate and synchronise product and 
information flows. This conflation will potentially give rise to substantial benefits in production 
and distribution efficiency, and particularly so when cross-border flows within global value 
chains are involved. We might thus expect the advent of the IoT to reduce the transaction costs 
associated with international production, and to facilitate an ever-deeper international division 
of labour in the global factory (Buckley and Strange, 2015). This echoes Ronald Coase (1937: 
397) who noted 80 years ago that “changes like the telephone and the telegraph which tend to 
reduce the cost of organising spatially will tend to increase the size of the firm. All changes 
which improve managerial technique will tend to increase the size of the firm.” 
But there are also drawbacks. As Bughlin et al (2015b: 8-9) note, the “prospect of 
implementing the Internet of Things should prompt even greater concern about cybersecurity 
among executives. IoT poses not only the normal risks associated with the increased use of 
data but also the vastly greater risks of systemic breaches as organizations connect to millions 
of embedded sensors and communications devices. Each is a potential entry point for malicious 
hackers, and …. the same interoperability that creates operational efficiency and effectiveness 
also exposes more of a company’s units to cyber-risks.” 
 
Big Data and Analytics (BDA) 
 For many years, firms made business decisions drawing upon data from a limited range 
of traditional sources such as production records, internal accounts, and market research 
reports. But data are now generated from a plurality of sources, notably including sensor-
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generated data from smart products and data from search engines and social media sites (e.g. 
Google, Facebook, Twitter), and this has provided firms with new sources of potentially 
valuable information (Davidson et al, 2012; Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013; George et 
al, 2014). This, together with improvements in computing power and lower data storage costs, 
has led to the growth of big data and analytics. As Davenport et al (2012) emphasise, a 
fundamental feature of BDA is that it is forward-looking, and involves mining existing and 
new data sources for patterns, events, and opportunities, whereas the traditional role of 
information technology (IT) had been more backward-looking and concerned with monitoring 
processes and notifying management of anomalies. McAfee and Brynjolfsson (2012) report 
that firms that have adopted BDA report consequent improvements in productivity and 
financial performance. 
 The potential implications of BDA for international business are both clear and 
considerable. In particular, firms be able to monitor emerging trends and opportunities in 
overseas markets without the need to make substantial resource commitments in local 
marketing affiliates, and they will be able to optimise more effectively their supply, production 
and distribution activities around the world. But there are two major caveats to corporate 
success in this brave new world. The first is that the availability of good-quality big data may 
well be a source of value for firms, but successful firms will require a range of technical and 
governance capabilities to analyse and operationalise that data so as to realise the potential 
benefits (Davidson et al, 2012; McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2012; Constantiou and Kallinikos, 
2015; Henke et al, 2016). The second is that individuals’ privacy will be under threat from 
widespread big data application. “When data becomes priceless, businesses will go an extra 
mile to procure it. Even today, prying eyes watch every move we make. Facebook knows what 
we like, Google knows what we browse, and Twitter knows what is on our mind. To top it all, 
our telecom service providers know where we are, and who we are connecting with. 
Collectively, it is an incredible amount of information and can be more than what our closest 
friends or family would know about us.” (Shukla, 2015) Some commentators even fear that 
BDA may provide a threat to democracy (Helbing et al, 2015). Some form of (transnational) 
governance regime will be necessary to regulate this intrusion, and this may well circumscribe 
the abilities of firms to maximise the commercial potential of BDA. “At the core of the problem 
is the dilemma thrown up by the very way that the IoT-enabled devices operate.  Having been 
designed exclusively to increase productivity and reduce costs, it’s very difficult to create a 
machine that takes more holistic ethical concerns into account.  Technology may have an 
‘ambient IQ’, but this is by no means the same as a moral compass.” (Maughan, 2014)  
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Robotics 
 As Sirkin et al (2015a) note, it was in the 1960s that industrial robots first began to 
appear on industrial assembly lines in the United States, Japan and Europe. But it is only 
recently that their widespread adoption has become a reality across a range of industries, and 
this this is due to a confluence of factors. First, the costs of both hardware and software have 
fallen by more than 20% over the past decade, whilst the performance of robotic systems has 
improved by about 5% per annum. Costs are projected to fall by a similar amount over the 
coming decade. As a result, robotic systems are fast becoming a viable economic alternative to 
human labour in many high-wage economies – though the cost-benefit trade-off varies across 
industrial sectors. Second, the technical capabilities of many traditional robotic systems have 
been limited, both in terms of the range of feasible operations and in location. But industrial 
robots are becoming more versatile and mobile, and able to perform more complex/delicate 
tasks and to work in less-structured environments. And the most advanced robots are also more 
intelligent in that they can provide and receive feedback to other parts of the production system 
though the IoT. Third, robotic systems have in the past involved both substantial capital 
expenditure and the employment of specialised operatives, and have thus largely been adopted 
only by large firms. But the improvements in the cost, performance and functionality of many 
robotic systems have permitted their adoption by many small and medium-sized enterprises. 
 Over the past few decades, there have been major shifts in the location of many 
manufacturing activities away from the high labour cost advanced economies of North 
America, Western Europe and Japan towards the emerging economies in search of lower 
production costs (Buckley and Strange, 2015). These shifts have been facilitated by a 
combination of market liberalization and economic restructuring in many countries, 
international trade and investment liberalization, financial deregulation and the integration of 
global capital markets, technological advances (notably in IT and transportation), and improved 
contract enforcement and protection of intellectual property rights in many jurisdictions 
(Strange and Magnani, 2017). The resultant GVCs involve a physical ‘slicing-up’ of many 
manufacturing value chains, with more labour-intensive activities being located in the lower-
cost emerging economies. The result has been an international fragmentation of production, 
with trade in intermediate goods accounting for over 60 percent of world exports - though with 
marked differences between countries and between products (UNCTAD 2013: 122). The 
greater availability and lower cost of industrial robotic systems will increasingly impact upon 
the economics of where to locate manufacturing activities, especially if labour and other 
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production costs continue to rise in many emerging economies and a fortiori if there is an 
increase in protectionist measures around the world (World Trade Organization, 2016). The 
result may well be the reshoring of many activities to the advanced economies (Albertoni et al, 
2015), though the aggregate scale of the reshoring phenomenon is thusfar still limited 
(Oldenski, 2015)4. 
 
Additive Manufacturing (3-D printing) 
 Traditional manufacturing processes are subtractive in that parts and components are 
fabricated using machining techniques which mostly rely on the removal of material by 
methods such as cutting, drilling, grinding, and sanding. The final products then require 
assembly of the parts and components. In contrast, 3-D printing5 is an additive process that 
creates products by building up successive layers of materials, thus circumventing the need for 
component assembly (de Jong and de Bruijn, 2013; Janssen et al, 2014). A digital model is first 
generated using computer-aided design (CAD) software, and is then printed as a three-
dimensional object in a 3-D printer from raw materials in either liquid or particle form. The 
printer deposits microscopically thin layers of the raw material, and the product gradually 
materializes as successive layers are deposited. Many different raw materials may be used as 
feedstock for 3-D printing, including metals, ceramics, plastics, synthetic resins, porcelain, and 
glass6. Some 3-D printers can combine various materials together in one final product, whilst 
others can print moving parts. 
 The adoption of additive manufacturing technologies potentially brings a number of 
advantages (Janssen et al, 2014; Sasson and Johnson, 2016; Laplume et al, 2016). First, 
standard CAD software can be used by anyone (with the necessary skills) anywhere in the 
world to design products, and then manufacture them using a suitable 3-D printer. Second, 
every product may be customized to meet the end-user’s requirements, as 3-D printing allows 
for cost-effective production of very small batches – something that is not possible with 
traditional manufacturing processes. Third, 3-D allows the relatively easy production of 
complex products, and may well reduce overall production time as several 
manufacturing/assembly steps are consolidated. Fourth, traditional manufacturing processes 
generate considerable waste, whilst products often contain surplus material that it is not 
feasible/economic to remove. In contrast, additive manufacturing generates little or no waste, 
and design may be optimized so that products use less material and are thus lighter and/or 
stronger. And, in principle, many additive processes can be reversed, thus dissolving final 
products into raw material solutions that can be re-used. Finally – and particularly important in 
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an international business context - products designed by CAD software can in principle be 
manufactured anywhere in the world there is a compatible 3-D printer. Manufacturing does not 
need to be centralized but may be undertaken close to the end-users, with consequent savings 
in delivery times and transportation costs, and reduced international flows of intermediate 
goods and services. Most raw materials are readily available from multiple suppliers and in 
most countries, hence supply chain risk is minimised. In short, GVCs may be considerably 
simplified in terms of the number of distinct activities, their geographical dispersion, and the 
relationships between independent participants. 
 However, additive manufacturing technologies currently suffer from a number of 
drawbacks, which limit their use (Janssen et al, 2014; Holweg, 2015; Sasson and Johnson, 
2016; Laplume et al, 2016). First and foremost, current additive technologies are relatively 
slow and inefficient whilst – unlike subtractive processes - production is not subject to 
economies of scale. Additive manufacturing processes are thus not currently suitable for mass 
production as unit costs are substantially higher, and their use has so far been largely confined 
to prototypes, high-value small-volume components, and out-of-production replacement parts. 
3-D printing is thus currently a viable option for more customized manufacturing applications 
and, as Sasson and Johnson (2016: 86) note, “3D printing provides the conditions where the 
number of available physical products may increase by several orders of magnitude. Similar to 
the manner that eBay created a platform for used goods, Amazon created a platform for less 
commonly purchased books, and Google created a market for less commonly sought 
information, 3D printing creates a market for less commonly demanded manufactured goods.” 
They also envisage the creation of 3-D printing supercenters (i.e. specialist facilities that 
undertake low-volume, customized production) that are co-located with more traditional 
production facilities. Second, there is a limited, but increasing, range of raw materials that can 
be used for 3-D printing, and also a limited range of colours and surface finishes. And most 
printers are limited in terms of the dimension of the end-product, so large products still have to 
be manufactured by other technologies. Third, 3-D printing cannot yet match the levels of 
engineering precision achieved by other technologies, and products also suffer from other 
limitations such as limited strength, lower resistance to heat and moisture, and compromised 
colour stability. 
 
Implications for International Business Practice 
Industry 4.0 is still in its infancy, and the widespread deployment of many of its 
constituent technologies is still some years away. But its effects are already having an impact 
8 
 
upon the nature of competition and corporate strategies in many industries (Porter and 
Heppelmann, 2014; Rüβmann et al, 2015; Lorenz et al, 2016; Rose et al, 2016). Greenberg et 
al, 2017) report that cross-border data flows are increasing at rates that are almost 50 times 
those of the last decade, during a time when traditional globalization metrics (trade and FDI 
flows) are slowing. And, as Kietzemann et al (2015: 214) comment in the context of additive 
manufacturing, “As with most disruptive technologies, it is likely that we will overestimate the 
potential of 3-D printing in the short term while underestimating it in the long term.” 
The widespread adoption of the constituent technologies has the potential to transform 
the location and organization of manufacturing production worldwide (Rüβmann et al, 2015)7, 
and also to further blur the distinction between what is considered a product and what is 
considered a service. Greater automation will displace lower-skilled labour, but increase 
demand for higher-skilled labour (e.g. software specialists, mechatronics engineers, data 
analysts). Integrated real-time communications through global value chains will reduce the 
need for work-in-progress inventory. And enhanced machine-to-machine and machine-to-
human interaction will allow greater product customization. Distribution will be effected by 
unmanned logistic drones, at least once the considerable safety issues have been resolved. 
Labour productivity should rise, and labour costs should fall, in the medium-term, and firms 
will base their production location decisions less on production costs and more on proximity 
to customers.  
New business models will emerge. Bogers et al (2015:225) envisage “a move from 
centralized to decentralized supply chains, where consumer goods manufacturers can 
implement a ‘hybrid’ approach with a focus on localization and accessibility or develop a fully 
personalized model where the consumer effectively takes over the productive activities of the 
manufacturer.” Customers will become more involved in GVCs, as providers of key 
information and feedback on products, and even as local manufacturers. Relationships between 
firms and customers will be redefined in many ways as big data and analytics allow the 
possibility to test in advance new products and services on clients located anywhere in the 
world, and to increasingly customise the firm offer to reduce development, launch and 
adaptation costs. The standardisation versus adaptation decision - long a key issue in 
international marketing theory and practice - will require a comprehensive re-evaluation in the 
light of this customisation.  
To compound the pressures on existing firms, new players will also emerge. The advent 
of the digital economy witnessed the arrival of firms like Google and Facebook, which now 
cater to billions of users. Their innovative business models provide different conceptions of 
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international business and the MNE, and Industry 4.0 will likewise lead to the rise of new 
organizations which leverage the new digital technologies but are not constrained by a need to 
adapt pre-existing models, routines and capabilities. The further growth of digital platforms for 
the distribution of products (e.g. Amazon, Alibaba) should also make it easier for small firms 
to enter global markets8. 
Finally new national and supranational institutional arrangements will emerge to reflect 
and regulate the emerging complex reality (Bhattarcharya et al, 2016). As Rüβmann et al 
(2015: 12) comment, the “growing interconnectivity of machines, products, parts, and humans 
will also require new internationals standards that define the interaction of these elements in 
the digital factory of the future. Efforts to develop these standards are in their infancy but are 
being driven by traditional standardization bodies and emerging consortia. Germany’s 
Plattform Industrie 4.0 was the first driver, but the US-based Industrial Internet Consortium 
(IIC) - founded in March 2014 by manufacturing, Internet, IT, and telecommunications 
companies – has become a prominent alternative. Subsequently, a new body, the 
Dialogplattform Industrie 4.0, was formed in Germany to counteract the IIC’s strong position. 
Several other standardization organizations have ambitions in the field.” New data protection 
laws and/or stronger industry self-regulation will need to be formulated to safeguard the 
privacy of individuals, and to put limits on what data can be accessed, stored and transmitted 
both nationally and across borders (Weber, 2010; Weber, 2013; Rose et al, 2015). Who will 
have legal title over, and who will bear legal responsibility for, products which involve 
consumer-generated intellectual property (Berthon et al, 2015), and how will these issues be 
handled in cross-border settings? Finally, the inevitable reconfiguration of global value chains, 
and the changing power relationships between the participants, will lead to ever-greater 
confusion about where products are made, where value is generated, who benefits, and thus 
where taxes and customs duties should be levied (Groth et al, 2014). Echoing the policy debate 
(Reich, 1990; Reich, 1991; Tyson, 1991) in the 1990s about who is “us” and who is “them”, 
governmental attitudes towards trade and investment promotion/regulation will need to adapt 
to the new reality. 
 
Final Comments 
 What are the implications of Industry 4.0 for MNEs and international business theory? 
First and foremost, the emergence of new institutional arrangements will clearly impact upon 
the activities and strategic decisions of MNEs, and this would be a fertile area for future 
research. Furthermore research might also consider the following questions, grouped according 
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to the familiar framework of the eclectic paradigm (Dunning 1977, 2000) and couched in terms 
of ownership, location, and internalization (OLI) advantages.  
 What will constitute important ownership (firm-specific) advantages under Industry 
4.0? What value chain activities will MNEs need to control, and what isolating mechanisms 
will they need to possess (Rumelt, 1984; Rumelt, 1987; Lawson et al, 2012) in order for them 
to capture the rents earned in GVCs? If manufacturing activities are carried out by a 
combination of publicly-available robotic systems and independent 3-D printing supercenters, 
then will the ownership of production capacity allow effective value capture, or can such 
activities be outsourced? Will it become more important for MNEs to control the design and 
distribution stages of GVCs? But 3-D printing will potentially allow customers to have greater 
input both in the design of their products, and control over where and when it is manufactured. 
Or will BDA adoption allow large firms to anticipate market trends and to offer customer 
benefits that are hard for competitors to imitate? Will formal property rights allocated by the 
State (e.g. patents, trademarks, licenses) or brand names and/or corporate reputations be 
effective isolating mechanisms in a world of product customization and dispersed 
manufacturing? 
 What will be the nature of location advantages under Industry 4.0? International 
Business is based on a concept of geography that may be partially challenged in an Industry 
4.0 scenario (Gress and Kalafski, 2015). Clearly the greater use of robotic systems will 
minimize the cost economies to be realized from locating manufacturing activities in low 
labour cost countries, such as the emerging economies. But will this mean that such activities 
are reshored to traditional (advanced economy) locations? If so, what will be the impact upon 
employment opportunities (Frey and Osborne, 2017) given the capital-intensive nature of the 
manufacturing process? Or will manufacturing activities increasingly be located closer to the 
final customers? Certainly this would be the logical conclusion from the widespread adoption 
of 3-D printing. These developments will have significant impacts upon what products are 
traded, what is exported from where and imported to where, and where jobs are sustained. The 
spread of additive manufacturing would reduce trade in finished goods, and local availability 
of the necessary raw materials would also reduce trade in intermediate goods. How will host 
and home country governments react, and what policies will they enact to promote/restrict trade 
and FDI? 
Finally, what internalization advantages will be critical under Industry 4.0? Are there 
advantages to being vertically-integrated in the face of the technological changes identified 
above (Afuah, 2001; Langlois, 2003) and, if so, what should be internalized and what should 
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be externalized? Should knowledge (including big data) be increasingly internalised within 
MNEs, whilst operations are increasingly externalised? Certainly it appears that the key 
capabilities that will guide firm performance in the future will be those that address, on the one 
hand, the need to anticipate and shape future customer demands and, on the other hand, the 
need to bring about greater efficiencies in the distribution of final goods. These capabilities are 
inextricably linked to the deployment of BDA and the Internet of Things, and it will be firms 
that can afford to invest in these nascent digital technologies and employ the associated high-
skilled skilled labour that will flourish. This is the future of the multinational enterprise in the 
coming decades of the 21st Century. 
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Notes 
1 Industry 4.0 is considered to be the fourth industrial revolution, following mechanization (the first revolution) 
in the nineteenth century, the intensive use of electrical energy for mass production (the second revolution) in the 
early part of the twentieth century, and widespread digitalization (the third revolution) in the 1970s. (Lasi et al, 
2014) 
2 Rüβmann et al (2015) list nine foundational technologies (i.e. big data & analytics; autonomous robots; 
simulation; horizontal and vertical system integration; the internet of things; cybersecurity; the cloud; additive 
manufacturing; and augmented reality) that are the building blocks of Industry 4.0, but we concentrate here on 
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just these four technologies because they are likely to have the most influence of firms’ international business 
activities. 
3 For instance, L’Oreal unveiled a smart hairbrush at the 2017 Consumer Electronics show in Las Vegas. The 
brush has sensors that detect hair quality and breakage, and can then communicate this data to an app and 
recommend treatments. See the report at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-38503932 (accessed 10 May 
2017)    
4 See also the January 2013 Special Report on ‘Outsourcing and offshoring’ in The Economist (2013). 
5 Additive manufacturing is the official term, but the technology is often referred to as 3-D printing and also as 
direct digital manufacturing (DDM). 
6 See also the May 2015 Technology Quarterly on ‘New materials in manufacturing’ in The Economist (2015). 
7 See also the literature on disruptive innovation (e.g. Christensen et al, 2017). 
8 In this context, see the 2016 proposal by the Alibaba CEO (Jack Ma) for an electronic world trade platform (e-
WTP), free of taxes and customs duties, for SMEs. See http://fortune.com/2016/08/22/alibabas-jack-ma-
cheerleads-for-totally-free-trade/ (accessed 10 May 2017)  
